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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of 
the Industrial Commission pursuant to former Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-86 (1994) (repealed effective July 1, 1997); Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-l-303(6) (1997)). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found that 
Petitioner George Farnworth (the "applicant") had failed to 
establish that he was unable to work as a result of his claimed 
industrial injuries. 
This issue requires review of the Industrial Commission's 
factual findings. These findings are entitled to deference, 
and the Court of Appeals will reverse such findings only if the 
petitioner establishes that they are not "supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(g) (1997). A 
person challenging such findings must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the findings, and then demonstrate that the findings 
are not supported by the evidence. VanLeeuwen v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission applied an incor-
rect standard in determining that the applicant failed to 
establish that his claimed permanent total disability was 
medically caused by his industrial injuries* 
1 
This is a question of law, which is reviewed for correct-
ness. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(d) (1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (198811 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who 
is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-
inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury or death, and 
such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such 
amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services 
and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the employer and its 
insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-67 (1988) 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability 
caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. . 
2These statutes are presented as in effect on May 2, 1989, 
the date of the injury which is the subject of this appeal. 
See, e.g. , Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 328 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (October 14, 1997) ("the law existing at the 
time of the injury applies in relation to that injury"). This 
statute has been amended and recodified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413 (1997) . 
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S T A T E M E N T 0 F T H E CASE 
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Order dismissing the claim., because the applicant had failed to 
establish that was permanently and t really disabled *s a 
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1). The applicant filed a timely Motion for Review. R. 155-
58. The Commission denied the motion, adopting Judge 
Elicerio's analysis and her conclusion that the applicant's 
work injuries did not cause his claimed disability. R. 183-85 
(Addendum Exhibit 2). This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
Petitioner George Farnworth (the "applicant") is seeking 
to have the Utah Transit Authority pay him permanent total 
disability compensation for elbow pain that came on while he 
was working for UTA in 1989 and subsided by 1993. On May 2, 
1989, he sustained an injury to his right elbow in the course 
of his employment as a bus driver. He was diagnosed as having 
lateral epicondylitis, and he underwent surgery in July 1989 
and January 1991. R. 146-47. He also underwent surgery on his 
left elbow in November 1992, after it developed epicondylitis 
as well.2 By April 1993, his right arm problems had "complete-
ly resolved," and he had only an "occasional bit of discomfort" 
in his left arm. R. 342/313.3 He was released to work around 
that time, and he has not sought any treatment or reported any 
arm pain to medical professionals since April 1993. 
2The left arm problem was found to be work-related by the 
Industrial Commission in 1992. R. 74-84. 
3In paginating the record for appeal, the Industrial 
Commission did not number each of the pages in the medical 
records exhibit or the Social Security records exhibit. The 
citation "R. 342/313" means page 313 of the medical records 
exhibit, which begins at page 342 of the Record on Appeal. 
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well, including jsthma and chronic bronchitis The medical 
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343/14. He was first treated in approximately 1973 or 1974, 
and he has attempted suicide at least five or six times. Id. 
His emotional and behavioral problems were attributed to his 
extremely tragic and violent family-of-origin problems. His 
father was abusive and violent and even went to prison for 
murdering the applicant's brother. R. 145, 343/015. In 
December 1990, he began to see a counselor, Katrina H. Miller, 
L.M.F.T. R. 224-228. The applicant spent the majority of his 
sessions discussing problems he was having with his wife, 
including difficulties in communication, problems with marital 
relations, problems with his stepdaughter, control of finances, 
etc. Id. He also indicated distress over the fact that both 
of his parents had died. R. 224. He further reported feelings 
of guilt for becoming annoyed with his stepfather, who was 
calling him three or four times per day. Id. The applicant 
also noted in one session that he was angry at UTA and 
"fighting" with them over a treatment for his elbows. Id. He 
saw Ms. Miller only four times, however, with the last visit on 
February 12, 1991. R. 159. 
In August 1992, the applicant applied for Social Security 
disability benefits. R. 343/001. In October of that year, his 
claim was denied, because his condition did not prevent him 
from working. R. 343/004-006. The hearing officer dismissed 
claims of both arm pain and depression. The officer noted that 
he had recovered from surgery and had full range of motion in 
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asked him to explain why he was unable to work, and the 
applicant stated that it was because of "chronic pain." Id. 
Dr. Heinbecker concluded that the applicant's depression 
was in partial remission, but that he did have a personality 
disorder with "passive-aggressive borderline and dependent 
features." R. 343/017. Dr. Heinbecker reported that the 
applicant was capable of handling his own funds and was able to 
understand and remember. Id. He noted that the applicant's 
ability to sustain concentration was impaired, not by 
depression, but by his claimed chronic pain. Id. 
The applicant presented numerous complaints to Dr. McFad-
den, including asthma, depression, severe migraine headaches 
(lasting up to two days and often accompanied by nausea), 
recurrent esophagitis, epicondylitis, back pain, sleep apnea, 
and hand tremors. R. 343/021-22. Dr. McFadden examined the 
applicant and reported that his elbows were nontender, that 
wrist extension and supination against resistance were not 
painful, and that the applicant had equal grip strength and was 
able to open a childproof container with one hand. R. 343/023. 
He noted that the epicondylitis imposed only "minimal 
restrictions with mild exertion today." R. 343/024. 
The applicant's request for reconsideration was denied by 
the Social Security Administration. R. 343/026. The denial 
letter indicated that, although the applicant had been 
diagnosed with depression, he was able to work. Id* The 
letter also pointed out that the applicant's motor and sensory 
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examinations were noxmal and that he had normal grip strength. 
Id. 
1 
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witness. R. 150-52. She found that the applicant had a 
history of giving unreliable information to the doctors 
evaluating him for the Social Security Administration. R. 151. 
For example, she noted that the applicant's right arm had been 
assessed to be normal and pain-free by mid-1991, and that in 
the spring of 1993 Dr. Sellers, his treating physician, consis-
tently found that his right arm problems had completely 
resolved. Id. However, at the very same time, the applicant 
was telling Dr. Heinbecker that the right arm surgery was not 
successful. Id. 
Judge Elicerio also found that the applicant was presently 
exaggerating the significance of the 1989 industrial accident 
and downplaying his nonindustrial problems, while he did the 
opposite when he was seeking Social Security benefits. Id. 
She noted that, at the time of the Social Security proceedings, 
the applicant reported that his left arm surgery was success-
ful, that he did not relate his arm pain as his most bothersome 
problem, and that his arm problems were found to cause only 
minimal restrictions. Now, however, he was claiming that his 
arm pain was his most serious problem. Id. She also noted 
that the applicant presented multiple nonindustrial sources of 
depression in 1993, but now he was claiming that the depression 
was related primarily to the arm pain. Id. And she pointed 
out that the applicant previously had claimed gastrointestinal 
problems and had said that his surgery was unsuccessful, but 
now he was saying that he had not had any gastrointestinal 
10 
problems since 1990. Id, She further noted that the applicant 
was now attempting to attribute his hand tremor and sleep apnea 
to the industrial accident, when there was no evidence to 
support such a contention. Id. 
In addition to finding the applicant's testimony not 
credible, Judge Elicerio found that the applicant had failed to 
prove that he was suffering from any limitations resulting from 
his 1989 industrial accident. Regarding his arm pain, she 
noted that the preponderance of the evidence showed that the 
applicant had a good recovery from his arm surgeries, with only 
minimal restrictions. R. 152. Regarding the depression, she 
found that the applicant failed to prove that he had permanent 
depression, that there was any residual pain to act as a source 
for his depression, or that any depression he had was related 
to his arm injury. R. 150, 152. She noted that the applicant 
had not received treatment for his depression since 1991, while 
he had sought treatment for a number of other problems (sup-
posedly of lesser significance), and that the most logical 
explanation was that the applicant's depression was not 
significantly affecting him. R. 150-51. Judge Elicerio 
acknowledged that the applicant had received a six percent 
permanent impairment for his arm injury, but she declined to 
find the applicant entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits solely on this basis. R. 152. 
On review, the Industrial Commission confirmed Judge Eli-
cerio' s ruling. The Commission adopted her findings of fact 
11 
and analysis and concluded that the applicant's work injuries 
did not medically cause his alleged permanent total disability. 
R. 184. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Applicant George Farnworth seeks to have the Utah Transit 
Authority pay him permanent total disability compensation for 
arm injuries and depression allegedly related to an arm injury 
he suffered in 1989, which cleared up years ago. He brought 
his claim before the Industrial Commission. The Commission's 
administrative law judge carefully weighed the medical evi-
dence, considered his testimony, and found that he had no case, 
because he was not a credible witness, and because he failed to 
prove that he was suffering from any disabling conditions 
attributable to the 1989 industrial injury. The applicant now 
appeals, but he has failed to demonstrate that there was 
anything wrong with the Commission's findings. Therefore, the 
Commission's order should be affirmed. 
First, substantial evidence supports the Industrial 
Commission's finding that the applicant was not disabled due to 
his industrial accident. To be entitled to permanent total 
disability compensation, an employee must prove that his 
disability is "caused by" an industrial accident. If he fails 
to establish the necessary causal connection, compensation must 
be denied. This is a question of fact, and the Commission's 
12 
finding will be upheld on appeal unless the petitioner marshals 
all of the evidence supporting the finding and demonstrates 
that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence. J 
The Commission found, as a factual matter, that the 
applicant was not suffering any disability attributable to his 
1989 injuries. The Commission, by adopting the findings and 
conclusions of the administrative law judge, found that the 
applicant's arm pain had resolved years ago, and that the 
applicant failed to prove that any depression he was suffering 
was related to the arm injury. The Commission also found that 
the applicant failed to establish that his depression was 
causing any disability. 
These findings must be affirmed. The applicant has 
completely neglected to marshal the evidence supporting the 
findings, and the findings are supported by substantial 
evidence. The medical evidence shows that the applicant's arm 
pain had cleared up years ago and that the applicant had 
longstanding preexisting depression, and the evidence does not 
prove that the applicant's depression is linked to his arm 
injuries, or that the depression is disabling. In addition, 
the medical evidence also reveals numerous other physical and 
emotional problems, completely unrelated to any industrial 
accident. The applicant testified that he had severe arm pain 
and depression, and that they were brought on by the 1989 
injuries, but the administrative law judge specifically found 
13 
that his testimony was not credible, and that he had a history 
of saying whatever he felt necessary to obtain compensation. 
Instead of marshaling the evidence supporting the find-
ings, the applicant relies on two pieces of evidence contra-
dicting the findings. But this evidence is not persuasive, and 
it certainly does not require reversal of the Commission's 
findings. The applicant relies on a Social Security award, but 
that award is not very probative. And the applicant also 
relies on a letter written by a mental health therapist, but 
that therapist has no basis for making an assessment as to the 
applicant's present condition or its causes, as she has not 
seen him since 1991. The Commission's findings are entitled to 
deference, and as such they must be affirmed. 
In addition, the Commission did not apply an improper 
standard in determining that the applicant had failed to 
establish that his disability was caused by his injuries. The 
Commission's findings establish that the applicant failed to 
prove that he was suffering from any disabling conditions 
related to his arm injuries. The administrative law judge did 
express uncertainty as to the precise boundaries of the 
causation standard, but her thorough analysis clearly 
demonstrates that the test she actually applied is correct. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING OF LACK OF MEDICAL 
CAUSATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The Commission's order should be affirmed. An employee 
seeking permanent total disability benefits must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that his disability was "caused 
by" an industrial accident. The applicant simply failed to 
meet this burden. The Commission found that the applicant 
failed to establish that he was presently suffering from any 
problems related to the industrial accident. The applicant has 
not marshalled the evidence supporting the Commission's 
findings, so they must be taken as conclusive, and these 
findings are supported by substantial evidence regardless. 
A. The applicant failed to prove that he is suffering 
from any disability related to his 1989 industrial 
accident. 
To be entitled to permanent total disability compensation, 
an employee must establish that his permanent total disability 
is "caused by an industrial accident." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
67(1) (1988) (amended and recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413 (1997)). Where an employee has a number of conditions 
contributing to permanent total disability,4 his or her 
4As did Judge Elicerio in her October 15, 1996, order, 
defendants assume, for purposes of this appeal only, that the 
applicant is permanently and totally disabled. Defendants 
emphatically do not concede that the applicant is actually 
permanently and totally disabled, and we point out that no such 
finding has been made. In fact, in its order denying the 
motion for review, the Industrial Commission took pains to 
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employer is liable to pay compensation only if the health 
problems giving rise to the alleged disability are "causally 
connected to the claimant's employment." Ortiz v. Indus. 
Commln, 766 P.2d 1092, 1094-95 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also 
Large v. Indus. Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The burden of proof is on the applicant, and he or she must 
prove medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Ortiz, 766 P.2d at 1095 (citing Large, 758 P.2d at 956). If 
the applicant fails to demonstrate a medical causal connection, 
compensation must be denied. Id. at 1094-95. 
Medical causation is a question of fact to be determined 
by the Industrial Commission. Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 
960, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When a petitioner challenges an 
agency's findings of fact, the appellate court must uphold the 
findings unless the petitioner establishes that they are not 
supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g) (1997); VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n. 901 P.2d 281, 284 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). The party challenging findings of fact 
must "'marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and 
show that despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence.'" VanLeeuwen, 901 
point out that it was referring to the applicant's "now-
claimed" and "alleged" permanent total disability. R. at 184. 
Therefore, in the unlikely event that this court were to 
reverse the Industrial Commission's order, the matter would 
have to be remanded to the Industrial Commission for a 
determination of all issues, including whether the applicant 
does in fact qualify as permanently and totally disabled. 
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P.2d at 284 (brackets in original). If the applicant fails to 
marshal the evidence supporting factual findings, the findings 
will accepted as conclusive. E.g., Merriam v. Board of Review, 
812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In our case, the administrative law judge found that the 
applicant had failed to prove that any disability he had was 
medically caused by his 1989 industrial accident. The appli-
cant claims that he is unable to work because of arm pain and 
depression caused by the 1989 injuries, but the judge found 
that the applicant was not suffering any disability under 
either theory. First, the applicant failed to prove that he 
was suffering any problems because of arm pain. The 
administrative law judge found, "The preponderance of the 
reliable evidence shows that the applicant had a good recovery 
from his industrial arm surgeries, with only minimal residual 
activity restriction and possibly discomfort." R. 152. The 
applicant also failed to prove his second theory, that he is 
disabled by depression brought on by the industrial accident. 
The administrative law judge found that "the applicant's 
inability to work at this time is not caused by any permanent 
aggravation to his preexisting depression resulting from arm 
pain associated with the industrial accident." R. 152. ! 
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B. The Commission's findings must be affirmed on 
appeal. 
1. The applicant failed to marshal the evidence 
behind the findings, and as such the findings 
must be taken as conclusive. 
If a party challenging factual findings fails to marshal 
the evidence supporting those findings, then the findings will 
be taken as conclusive. Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 
447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In our case, the applicant has 
not marshaled any of the evidence supporting the Commission's 
critical findings. Instead, the only evidence he presents is 
evidence contradicting those findings. This does not meet the 
marshaling requirement, and as such the Commission's findings 
must be affirmed. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of 
Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. The Commission's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence. 
a. Substantial evidence supports the 
Commission's finding that the applicant is 
not suffering any disability caused by arm 
pain. 
In addition, even if this court were to review these 
findings on the merits, it would easily conclude that the 
findings are based on substantial evidence. First, substantial 
evidence supports the judge's finding that the applicant is no 
longer suffering from any arm pain. As the judge noted, "the 
records show only a good surgical result from the arm 
surgeries, with little or no pain or restriction in the arms by 
April 1993." R. 150. The applicant underwent his last surgery 
on his right elbow in January 1991. R. 342/036. By June of 
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that year, that elbow was "doing quite well," R. 342/299, and 
by that September, it was "great": he reported no pain 
whatsoever in his arm, wrist, hand, or fingers, and no numbness 
or tingling. R. 342/464. 
From September 1991 through April 1993, the applicant saw 
Dr. Daniel Sellers at least six times for treatment on his 
other elbow, and he never raised a single complaint about any 
right arm pain. R. 342/302 - 342/313. Finally, in April 1993, 
Dr. Sellers reported that the applicant's right arm problems 
had "completely resolved." R. 342/313. It is an interesting 
coincidence that the only times the applicant ever complained 
of right arm pain after June 1991 were (1) when he was seeking 
Social Security disability, and (2) when he was seeking 
workers' compensation benefits. R. 343/015, R. 149. 
There is also evidence to support the judge's finding that 
the applicant was not suffering any residual problems from his 
left arm. By April 1993, the applicant had "just an occasional 
bit of discomfort," and that was only after using his arm 
extensively." R. 342/313. Further, the consultation 
examination performed by Dr. McFadden on behalf of the Social 
Security Administration revealed only "minimal restrictions." 
R. 343/024. And again, the applicant did not seek any 
treatment for his left arm after April 1993, while he did seek 
treatment for a number of other medical problems. 
The only evidence the applicant presents to challenge the 
Commission's finding regarding arm pain is the claim that the 
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Social Security ALJ, Judge Robin Henrie, found that the 
applicant had "severe" epicondylitis. R. 343/034. However, 
this is not compelling evidence. 
First, Judge Henrie's ruling does not necessarily indicate 
that he found that the applicant's epicondylitis was severe. 
Judge Henrie stated the following: 
The claimant's impairments which are considered to 
be "severe" under the Social Security Act are back 
problems, upper lateral epicondylitis in both arms, 
migraine headaches, asthma, depression, and radial 
tunnel syndrome. 
R. 343/034. But while this means that the ALJ found that the 
"impairments" were severe, it does not indicate that the ALJ 
found that the epicondylitis was severe. For under the Social 
Security Administration regulations, if a claimant seeks 
disability for more than one impairment, the combined effect of 
those impairments is considered in a disability claim, without 
regard to whether any single impairment is "severe." 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1523 (1997). 
But even if Judge Henrie did find that the applicant had 
severe epicondylitis, that would not justify reversing the 
Commission. Judge Henrie's ruling is not "evidence"; there is 
nothing to show that he is a qualified medical expert on 
epicondylitis. In addition, a ruling in an informal, nonadver-
sarial proceeding cannot be binding in any way upon the Com-
mission or UTA, particularly since UTA was not a party to the 
Social Security proceedings. 
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And apart from these concerns, the judge's ruling is 
simply not persuasive. Judge Henrie did not give any explana-
tion or analysis to support his assessment of the applicant's 
condition. Also, it is doubtful that Judge Henrie had access 
to all of the relevant medical records, for if he had, he would 
have certainly noticed that the applicant had reported to his 
treating physician a complete resolution of symptoms in his 
right arm, and only minimal symptoms in his left. R. 342/313. 
In fact, he probably would have noticed that the applicant's 
complaints in the consultative examinations directly conflicted 
with the reports he was giving his own treating physician at 
the same time. Finally, even if the applicant did have 
"severe" epicondylitis in 1993, that would not mean that he was 
still suffering from that condition in 1996. 
b. Substantial evidence supports the 
Commission's finding that the applicant is 
not suffering any disability due to 
industrially caused depression. 
Substantial evidence also supports Judge Elicerio's find-
ing that the applicant's inability to work did not result from 
depression associated with the 1989 industrial accident. In 
order to be entitled to permanent total disability benefits for 
depression, the applicant would have to prove (1) there is a 
causal connection between his 1989 injuries and his present 
depression, and (2) there is a causal connection between his 
present depression and his claimed permanent total disability. 
He has failed to prove either step. 
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The administrative law judge specifically found that the 
applicant had suffered from severe depression long before the 
1989 injury. She noted that the medical records revealed that 
the applicant had been treated for depression since the 1970's, 
and that he had attempted suicide several times. R. 145. The 
applicant had been through "extremely tragic and violent 
family-of-origin problems." Id. He reported that his father 
was violent and abusive, and that his father had even been 
imprisoned for murdering the applicant's brother. R. 343/015. 
The record also revealed numerous nonindustrial causes for 
depression in the past few years. The applicant has a host of 
physical problems, including chronic back pain, esophagitis, 
asthma, migraine headaches, and hand tremors. R. 343/021. And 
in late 1990, when the applicant began seeing Katrina Miller, 
his mother had recently died, and his daughter was suffering 
from leukemia. R. 147. And the notes from the applicant's 
sessions with Ms. Miller reveal that the applicant was 
undergoing a great deal of problems with his wife, including 
problems with communication, marital relations, control of 
finances, etc. R. 224-228. 
When the applicant saw Dr. Heinbecker in 1993, he went 
into great detail explaining the psychological problems he was 
facing. R. 343/016. But nowhere did he attribute his depres-
sion or other problems to either his arm injury or his rela-
tionship with UTA. Id. The applicant did state that he was 
suffering cluster headaches, chronic back pain, and chronic 
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pain in his arms, but as shown by the records of his treating 
physician, his arm pain had cleared up by then, so any pain the 
applicant was feeling must have come from his back pain and 
headaches. 
Indeed, Dr. Heinbecker reported at that time that the 
applicant's depression was in partial remission, and he 
concluded that the applicant's inability to work at that point 
was due to chronic pain, and not to depression. R. 343/017. 
The applicant's depression interfered with his ability to 
interact socially, but not to sustain concentration or 
persistence. Id. I 
Once again, the evidence the applicant presents in his 
brief does not compel reversal of the administrative law 
judge's findings. As discussed earlier, the Social Security 
ruling is of limited significance. However, even the Social 
Security ruling does not mention any connection between the 
applicant's arm injury and his depression. Also, after finding 
that the applicant suffered from depression, Judge Henrie 
assessed the functional limitations imposed by that condition.5 
5Under the Social Security regulations, if a claimant has 
a physical impairment that meets or equals a listed impairment, 
disability is presumed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (1997). 
However, if a claimant is seeking a disability award for a 
mental impairment, the hearing officer or administrative law 
judge is required to consider any functional limitations 
imposed by that impairment, looking at four key areas of 
functioning: activities of daily living; social functioning; 
concentration, persistence, or pace; and deterioration or 
decompensation in work or a work-like setting. 20 C.F.R. § 
404.1520a (1997). In order to meet the listing for an 
"affective disorder," a claimant must demonstrate functional 
limitations in at least two of the four categories. 20 C.F.R. 
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Judge Henrie found that the applicant did not have any func-
tional limitations significant enough to meet the requirements 
for a listed impairment. R. 343/037. 
And Judge Elicerio was certainly acting within her 
discretion to refuse to be persuaded by the letter written by 
Katrina Miller in 1995. R. 159. Once again, this letter is 
simply not compelling evidence. First, Ms. Miller does not 
appear to have been in a good position to give a reliable 
assessment of the applicant's condition or its causes. She had 
only seen the applicant four times, over a period of only two 
months, and the letter was written a full four years after the 
last time she had seen the applicant. Id. In addition, it 
does not appear that Ms. Miller had sufficient information 
regarding the applicant's own history. For example, Ms. Miller 
stated that while the applicant had had his share of "stress" 
in the past, he had been able to employ coping strategies to 
effectively mitigate that stress. She stated that the 
applicant "was able to look at his problems as challenges, and 
felt he had a reasonable amount of control in his life." Id. 
She was apparently unaware that the applicant had in fact been 
depressed for most of his life, and that he had made a number 
of suicide attempts. 
In addition, Ms. Miller's assessment is based upon the 
information that the applicant gave her, but Judge Elicerio 
specifically found that the applicant has had a history of 
Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P (1997); R. 343/037. 
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giving unreliable information to his physicians. R. 151. 
Finally, Ms. Miller's letter refers to "the fact that [the 
applicant] has not recovered from his depression." R. 159. 
But Ms. Miller acknowledged that she had not seen the applicant 
in over four years, so it would be impossible for her to make 
this assessment. And Ms. Miller's 1995 letter appears to be 
inconsistent with her own treatment notes; the notes from her 
sessions with the applicant reveal only a brief mention of 
"fighting" with UTA; instead, the overwhelming majority of the 
time was spent discussing the problems the applicant was having 
with his wife, including communication problems, marital 
relations, etc. R. 224-28. 
c. The Commission specifically found that the 
applicant was not credible. 
It is highly significant that Judge Elicerio specifically 
found that the applicant was not a credible witness, and that 
the statements he made to his evaluating physicians were not 
reliable. Judge Elicerio noted that the applicant reported 
symptoms to his evaluating physicians that directly contra-
dicted the reports he was giving his own treating physicians at 
the same time. R. 151. The judge also found that the 
applicant was exaggerating the importance of his industrial 
injury while downplaying his nonindustrial problems, while 
during the social security proceedings he did the opposite. 
Id. Finally, Judge Elicerio found it inconsistent that the 
applicant could claim that his arm pain and depression were his 
25 
most significant problems, when he had not sought any treatment 
for those problems for years. R. 150-51. 
Judge Elicerio's finding regarding the applicant's 
credibility is entitled to great deference. This court has 
specifically noted that "the fact finder is in the best 
position to judge the credibility of a witness." Featherstone 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Indeed, the trier of fact may even choose to disbelieve 
uncontroverted testimony. Id. An appellate court will rarely 
if ever overturn a factual determination that a witness is not 
credible, particularly where that finding is as well-supported 
as the one in this case. 
d. The Commission's findings are entitled to 
deference. 
This court has explained that "'it is not our prerogative 
on review to reweigh the evidence. Instead, we defer to the 
Commission's findings because, when reasonably conflicting 
views arise, it is the Commission's province to draw inferences 
and resolve those conflicts.'" VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 
901 P.2d 281, 284 (quotation omitted). The appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment for the Industrial Commission 
"even though we may have come to a different conclusion had the 
case come before us for de novo review." Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). It is 
the applicant's burden to present enough evidence to prove his 
case, and the Commission, after carefully considering the 
evidence, found that he simply had not met his burden. The 
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applicant failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Commis-
sion's factual findings, and the evidence that the applicant 
did choose to discuss does not weaken the validity of those 
findings. The Commissions'' findings must therefore be 
affirmed. 
C. Utah case law supports the Commission's decision. 
This court has previously upheld denials of permanent 
total disability benefits when an employee's disability was 
caused by conditions other than a work-related injury. For 
example, in Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), this court affirmed the Commission's denial of 
permanent total disability benefits for an employee who had 
sustained a ten percent impairment from an industrial accident. 
Medical examinations revealed that the applicant was suffering 
from preexisting arthritis, fibrositis, and other problems, and 
the Commission found that the employee's age, obesity, lack of 
transferable skills and preexisting back condition caused his 
disability. Id. at 955. The court found that this finding was 
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 957. 
Similarly, in Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 766 P.2d 
1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the employee sustained an industrial 
back injury and then was involved in two automobile accidents. 
In support of his claim for permanent total disability bene-
fits, he testified that, even before the automobile accidents, 
he had been suffering from increasing back pain. In addition, 
he introduced medical evidence that his back was gradually 
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degenerating and that he would have been forced to retire early 
even without the auto accidents. The medical panel, however, 
disagreed, finding no evidence of degeneration. The Commission 
chose to believe the medical panel report and to disbelieve the 
employee's evidence. Once again, this court affirmed. Id. at 
1095. 
Finally, in Zupon v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 960 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), this court upheld a denial of permanent 
total disability benefits, even though the employee had 
suffered a ten percent permanent partial impairment from an 
industrial back injury. The employee had received a Social 
Security Disability award, but the basis of this award was 
arthritis in his hands. The Commission held that the employee 
had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
his industrial accident was a medical cause of his claimed 
permanent total disability, and this court affirmed, finding 
that the Commission's ruling was based on substantial ervidence. 
Our case is analogous to Large, Ortiz, and Zupon. Just as 
in those cases, the applicant is claiming permanent total 
disability for an industrial injury, but the evidence shows 
that, if the applicant is permanently totally disabled, it is 
not because of the industrial accident. The applicant has a 
host of other physical and emotional problems unrelated to the 
accident, as detailed by Judge Elicerio, and while the 
applicant does suffer from depression, the judge found that 
this depression was not related to the industrial accident. 
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The judge also found that the applicant is not suffering 
limitations due to arm pain. The applicant has received a six 
percent impairment rating for his arm, but his rating was less 
than the ten percent rating given the employee in Zupon. 860 
P.2d at 963. Just as in those cases, the Commission's ruling 
is supported by substantial evidence, and this court should 
affirm. 
II. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPLIED THE CORRECT 
LEGAL STANDARD 
There is nothing to support the applicant's contention 
that the Commission applied an improper standard. While Judge 
Elicerio expressed some uncertainty regarding the precise 
boundaries of the test for medical causation, a reading of her 
opinion demonstrates that the test she actually applied was 
correct. Additionally, a reading of the ALJ's and the 
Commission's orders shows that the Commission's finding that 
the applicant had failed to prove medical causation was 
supported by substantial evidence, regardless of the precise 
test used, because the applicant failed to prove that he 
suffered any limitations related to his 1989 industrial 
accident. 
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A. The Commission did not require the applicant to 
prove a "substantial connection" between his 
industrial accident and his claimed disability. 
In her order dismissing the applicant's claim, Judge 
Elicerio reasoned as follows: 
The ALJ knows that the appellate courts have been 
scornful of reading any requirement of "substan-
tially "-caused-by into the law. However, taken to 
its illogical extreme, if one uses the opposite 
standard, namely any-causal-contribution-is-
sufficient, then any applicant with some 
industrially caused permanent impairment can argue 
that their eventual discontinuance of work was 
caused by the industrial accident, no matter how 
small it is, because that impairment contributed to 
their overall disability. . • . Because the ALJ is 
disinclined to read the law to require all 
applicants with permanent impairment to be entitled 
to permanent total disability benefits when they 
discontinue working, the ALJ will not apply the any-
causal-contribution-is-sufficient standard in this 
case. 
R. 152 (italics and bold print added) (Addendum Exhibit 1). 
As the court can see, there is nothing wrong with the 
analytical process used by the administrative law judge. In 
her analysis, she specifically acknowledged that the case law 
does not require that a disability be "substantially" caused by 
an industrial injury to be compensable. In the passages empha-
sized above, Judge Elicerio simply noted that she would not 
require an employer to pay permanent total disability compen-
sation on the mere showing that an employee had an industrial 
impairment; instead, she was going to require some level of 
actual causal connection between the industrial accident and 
the claimed disability. 
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And Judge Elicerio's reasoning in this regard was com-
pletely correct: it has never been held that the mere fact 
that an employee has some industrially caused impairment en-
titles that person to permanent total disability compensation. 
"Impairment" and "disability" are distinct concepts, and the 
fact that the applicant has an impairment does not mean that he 
has any disability whatsoever. See, e.g., Smith v. Mity Lite, 
939 P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See also Zupon, 860 
P. 2d 960 (claim for permanent total disability properly 
rejected even though the employee had a 10% permanent partial 
impairment resulting from an industrial accident); Large, 758 
P.2d 954 (benefits denied even though the applicant had a 5% 
impairment attributable to his industrial accident). See also 
Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1986) (permanent total disability claim properly denied even 
though the employee had a thirty-five percent impairment from 
his industrial accident). 
A look at the reasoning actually employed by Judge 
Elicerio shows that she used the proper test. In her order, 
she found that the applicant failed to prove that he was 
suffering from any disability as a result of the 1989 arm 
injuries. She found that his arm problems themselves had been 
resolved for years, and that he had failed to prove that he was 
presently suffering from depression related to the arm 
problems. She also found that the applicant was not credible. 
Based on these findings, which were not properly challenged on 
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appeal, her finding that the applicant failed to prove medical 
causation is perfectly in accord with the test used in the 
governing authority, including Large, Ortiz, and Zupon. 
We also note that the Commission, and not the 
administrative law judge, is the ultimate finder of fact, 
Commercial Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), and there is nothing in the Commission's order 
denying the applicant's motion for review to suggest that the 
Commission required a "substantial connection" between the 
applicant's work injury and his claimed disability. 
B. The Commission's findings are entitled to be upheld 
because they are supported by substantial evidence, 
regardless of whether the Commission clearly 
articulated the precise standard. 
The Court of Appeals will uphold Industrial Commission 
findings where they are supported by substantial evidence, even 
if the Commission does not clearly or precisely articulate the 
standard it is following, and even if the Commission applies an 
incorrect standard. For example, in Intermountain Health Care 
v. Board of Review, 839 P.23 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the 
administrative law judge had asked the medical panel whether 
there was a "medically demonstrable causal connection" between 
the applicant's industrial accident and back problems she 
suffered after a subsequent event. Id. at 843. The Commission 
awarded benefits and the employer appealed, arguing that the 
ALJ had used an improper standard. The court noted that the 
standard as phrased in the request to the medical panel was 
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incorrect, but it explained that "despite the imprecise 
phrasing of the causation question submitted to the medical 
panel, the ALJ, after examining the panel's report, applied the 
correct legal standard in determining causation." Id. at 846. 
And in Large, this court affirmed the Commission's 
decision even when the Commission actually did apply an 
incorrect standard. 758 P.2d at 957. As discussed earlier, 
the issue in Large was whether the employee's permanent total 
disability was medically caused by his industrial accident. In 
rejecting the employee's claim, the Commission had used a 
"proximate cause" analysis. This court held that a proximate 
cause analysis is not proper in workers' compensation matters, 
but it upheld the decision anyway, concluding that the findings 
were supported by substantial evidence. The court held, 
"Although the Industrial Commission erroneously applied the 
proximate cause test rather than the causation test articulated 
in Allen and Hodges, we find substantial evidence to support a 
finding that the 1985 injury was not the medical cause of 
Large's permanent total disability status . . . ." Id. at 957. 
In our case, it is clear from the record that neither the 
administrative law judge nor the Industrial Commission applied 
an incorrect standard. The law requires the applicant to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a "causal connec-
tion," and the Commission simply found that the applicant 
failed to meet this burden. Just as in Intermountain Health 
Care and Large, the fact that the administrative law judge's 
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language may have been a little imprecise does not compel 
reversal of the findings, especially where those findings are 
clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
C. Under the governing statute, an employee must prove 
more than a mere "causal connection" to be entitled 
to permanent total disability compensation. 
Finally, something more than a mere "causal connection" is 
required to justify awarding permanent total disability bene-
fits under the statute governing permanent total disability 
claims. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (1988). The cases 
applying the mere "causal connection" standard to permanent 
total disability claims, such as Large, adopted this standard 
directly from Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986). But Allen did not deal with the permanent total 
disability statute. Instead, Allen interpreted and applied 
section 35-1-45, which required that, for an accident to be 
compensable at all, it need only "aris[e] out of and in the 
course of" the employment. Allen, 729 P.2d at 18, 24. 
Permanent total disability claims, however, are governed 
by a different statute, section 35-1-67. And up until 1995, 
that statute expressly provided that permanent total disability 
benefits were to be awarded only "[i]n case of permanent total 
disability caused by an industrial accident." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-67(1) (1988).6 This standard is significantly stricter 
6In 1995 this statute was amended. The language in the 
opening sentence was changed to "permanent total disability 
resulting from an industrial accident," but elsewhere the statute 
was amended to clarify that permanent total disability benefits are 
to be awarded only where an employee suffers a "significant" 
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than the one set forth in section 35-1-45• As this court has 
recently noted, 
"'Arising out of,/H however, does not mean that the 
accident must be "'caused by/n the employment; 
rather, the employment "is thought of more as a 
condition out of which the event arises than as the 
force producing the event in affirmative fashion.'" 
Buczvnski v. Indus. Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (emphasis in original) (quoting Commercial Carriers, 888 
P.2d at 712). 
Thus, as the reasoning from Buczynski, Commercial 
Carriers, and several other cases demonstrates, a requirement 
that disability be "caused by" an accident necessitates a 
stronger causal connection than a requirement that an injury 
merely "arise out of" the employment. And while section 35-1-
45 does not require that a disability be "caused by" the 
employment, section 35-1-67 does by its own terms. 
The statutory requirement of a stricter standard for 
permanent total disability claims makes perfect sense. For the 
"arising out of" statute, section 35-1-45, is simply the 
"gateway" statute; any employee must meet that standard, even 
if he or she is simply asking the employer to pay for something 
like x-rays. In addition, compensation for temporary total, 
temporary partial, or permanent partial is limited under the 
statute, both because compensation is awarded only while the 
impairment, and if that impairment is a "direct" cause of the 
permanent total disability. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1)(b) 
(1995 Supp.). 
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employee still needs it and because the statute provides a 
maximum level of benefits. 
Permanent total disability benefits, however, are of a 
completely different nature. Most significantly, they provide 
a lifetime entitlement.7 And, as the statute read at the time 
of the applicant's injury, there was no provision for future 
reexamination of a worker's need for permanent total disability 
compensation, nor was there a provision for a setoff should the 
employee find gainful employment. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-67 (1988) with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(7) , (11) (1997). 
Thus, while temporary total disability ceases when the employee 
is no longer disabled, permanent total disability does not. It 
is entirely logical that the legislature would require a higher 
level of causation before awarding a person lifetime benefits. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
This case presents a classic example of why appellate 
courts grant deference to an agency's factual findings. The 
evidence before the Commission included over 500 pages of 
medical records alone, plus the applicant's live testimony. 
Judge Elicerio personally saw and heard the applicant and 
7While the employer is directly liable for the first 312 
weeks of compensation under the 1988 version of the statute, 
lifetime benefits would still have to be paid by the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, which is financed by a tax on workers' 
compensation insurers. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(4) (1988), 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-9-101(2) (1996). 
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sifted through the evidence, and she is by far in the best 
position to make a ruling as to whether the applicant's claimed 
disability resulted from his industrial accidents. Judge 
Elicerio's thorough order shows that the judge considered the 
evidence carefully and that she used a logical and sound 
reasoning process in reaching her decision* Her decision is 
certainly supported by the evidence, even if she did express 
uncertainty regarding the precise boundaries of the standard 
she was applying. The Commission then reviewed the 
administrative law judge's ruling and came to the same finding. 
The petitioner has not demonstrated any error, and as such the 
Commission's order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Utah Transit Authority therefore respectfully 
requests that this court affirm the Industrial Commission's 
order denying the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability compensation. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 1997. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
TH^EODORE E. KANELL 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Utah Transit Authority 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 94842 
GEORGE FARNWORTH, 
Applicant, 
VS. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
(Self-Insured), 
Defendant. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
February 9, 1995 at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing 
was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
David K. Smith, Attorney. 
The defendant was represented by Theodore Kanell, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for permanent tot^l disability 
claim related to a May 2, 1989 right elbow injury. The self-
insured employer initially accepted liability on the elbow injury 
and paid temporary total compensation (TTC) from May 2, 1989 
through May 31, 1990, at the rate of $300.00/week, for a total of 
$14,143.00. The employer also paid for a 10% upper extremity (6% 
whole person) permanent impairment rating for the right elbow/arm 
(21.8 weeks of benefits at the rate of $229.00/week for a total of 
$4992.20). After the applicant returned to work at UTA, he 
developed left elbow/arm problems and additional right elbow/arm 
problems. A dispute arore regarding the employer's liability for 
additional treatment and time off work. This dispute was resolved 
pursuant to Industrial Commission litigation, culminating in 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued by this ALJ 
on October 7, 1992. Pursuant to that order, the applicant was 
awarded additional TTC for the period of January 7, 1991 through 
January 28, 1991, for time off work related to a second right elbow 
surgery, and was awarded additional future TTC for time off work 
related to a left elbow surgery, yet to occur at the time of the 
issuance of the order. The extent of benefits paid related to the 
left elbow surgery (accomplished in November 1992) is unclear. 
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The current claim for permanent total disability benefits 
related to the May 2, 1989 industrial accident was filed on 
September 26, 1994. A cover letter signed by the applicant's 
attorney, filed with the application for hearing, indicates that 
the applicant's claim for permanent total disability benefits was 
related to injury to the applicant's arms that "triggered the onset 
of a deep depression from which he was unable to recover." At 
hearing, the applicant clarified the basis of the claim to be 
chronic bilateral arm pain, with aggravation to the applicant's 
pre-existing depression related to that pain. The defendant denied 
liability for the permanent total disability claim, because the 
medical records reflect that the applicant had a successful 
recovery from the elbow/arm surgeries, with minimal residual 
impairment. At the time of the hearing, the defendant pointed out 
that the applicant was offered a light duty release after his final 
elbow/arm surgery and was engaged in a vocational rehabilitation 
program during 1990-91, through the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services. The defendant maintains that the applicant's December 
1993 Social Security Disability award is based on several 
conditions that are completely unrelated to his May 1989 industrial 
accident, including problems that both pre-existed the industrial 
accident and that developed after that accident. As such, the 
defendant maintains that the Social Security Disability award is 
not supportive of the applicant's claim that he is permanently 
totally disabled due to the May 1989 right elbow injury. 
At the time of the hearing, the ALJ inquired regarding 
psychiatric treatment records for the depression, as none were 
contained in the medical record exhibit submitted at hearing. The 
applicant identified several medical care providers at that time 
and the ALJ agreed to allow additional time post-hearing for 
submission of a joint addendum medical record exhibit. That 
exhibit never was filed, and as a result, the ALJ presumed that the 
applicant had decided not to pursue the claim any longer and she 
dismissed the case, explaining why, in an Order of Dismissal dated 
June 20, 1996. On June 25, 1996, the ALJ received a letter from 
counsel for the applicant, indicating that he objected to dismissal 
of the case, as he had presumed that the defendant was going to 
submit the addendum exhibit. With the letter, the applicant's 
attorney submitted a letter of K. Miller, LMFT, dated October 25, 
1995, along with several pages of handwritten office notes, as 
medical evidence of the applicant's treatment for depression. 
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On July 18, 1996, the ALJ wrote counsel for the applicant 
and indicated that she was considering his June 25, 1996 letter to 
be a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal. The ALJ gave the 
defendant 15 days in which to respond to that Motion. The ALJ also 
commented in her responsive letter to the applicant's attorney that 
the addtional records submitted might be insufficient to support a 
claim for permanent total disability based on depression. On July 
23, 1996 the ALJ received the defendant's response to the 
applicant's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal. On August 
8, 1996, the ALJ wrote the parties and indicated that she was 
considering the matter ready for an order on the Motion as of 
August 8, 1996. The ALJ indicated that she felt the primary issue 
that needed resolution was whether or not the applicant had 
submitted sufficient supportive medical evidence in order to 
establish that the May 2, 1989 industrial accident was the cause of 
his permanent total disability. The ALJ indicated that she planned 
to review all the evidence presented, including some piecemeal 
loose medical records that the applicant had submitted post-
hearing, the official joint medical record exhibit (Exhibit D-l) 
and the applicant's hearing testimony. 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED: 
The ALJ will attempt to summarize the evidence 
chronologically, but this case presents some difficulty in this 
regard, as the applicant developed many of his conditions 
simultaneously, and got treatment for his different non-industrial 
medical problems on-and-off, before, during and after his treatment 
for his industrially related arm problems. Chronologically, the 
first medical records are from the 1970's and early 1980's, 
consisting primarily of emergency room admissions for overdoses of 
drugs and alcohol and suicide/homicide threats or attempts. Based 
on the very brief ER summaries, the applicant's 
emotional/psychiatric problems, at that time, were due to extremely 
tragic and violent family-of-origin problems. The last ER 
admission for this is dated 1984, with most of the admissions 
occurring in 1978. 
The applicant had gastro-intestinal problems, prompting 
physician review, beginning in 1986 and 1987. These problems were 
eventually diagnosed as including a hiatal hernia, reflux 
esophagitis, and duodenal ulcers. The next intensive medical 
review/treatment that the applicant had was related to his elbows 
(lateral epicondylitis) in 1989 and early 1990. A detailed history 
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of the applicant's right elbow treatment following the May 2, 1989 
industrial accident is found in the ALJ's earlier order dated 
October 7, 1992. In summary, the applicant had a release surgery 
on the right arm in July 1989 and was released to return to work in 
October 1989. The applicant worked about 3 weeks and then was off 
work again, pursuing treatment/analysis of symptoms in both elbows. 
The applicant returned to work again in November 1989 and worked 
very sporadically thereafter until April or May 1990, getting 
conservative care for his elbows during that time. Then, in April 
or May of 1990, the applicant had back surgery. The ALJ mentions 
this in her previous order, but she has never received any medical 
records relating to this. The surgery apparently helped somewhat, 
but the applicant was to have chronic back pain develop in the 
future. In June 1990, the applicant's treating physician for the 
right elbow, Dr. D. Sellers, rated the applicant's right elbow (10% 
upper extremity/6% whole person) and the applicant was paid for the 
impairment. 
While attending school during the Summer and Fall of 1990, 
the applicant continued with some conservative care for both of his 
elbows from both Dr. D. Sellers and Dr. J. Adams. Additional 
surgery for one or both elbows was recommended, but was postponed 
to allow the applicant to continue his schooling. He apparently 
was involved in electronics training initially. The applicant 
stated at hearing that he had problems with pain (unspecified) and 
concentration in school and ended up missing quite a t(it of school. 
Per his testimony, DRS then recommended he switch to schooling at 
Salt Lake Community College, but the applicant stated he was unable 
to attend even one hour of classes (unclear why). The applicant 
had a Nissen fundoplication surgery, in September 1990, to deal 
with his gastro-intestinal problems. A physician who reviewed the 
applicant's medical conditions in relation to his application for 
Social Security benefits, specified, in 1993, that the applicant 
felt that that surgery was not effective. 
Although there are numerous prior indications in the records 
that the applicant had chronic bronchitis/asthma due to a long 
history of smoking cigarettes, the first indication that the ALJ 
can find, indicating prescription of an inhaler, is in December 
1990. The applicant continued with breathing/coughing problems 
thereafter, prompting physician review and treatment, primarily at 
Granger Medical Clinic, through at least 1994. There continued to 
be a dispute between the applicant and UTA regarding management of 
his elbow treatment and in December 1990, the applicant began to 
see a counselor for psychological therapy for his depression. This 
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counselor was Katrina Miller, LMFT. Her letter to the applicant's 
attorney dated October 25, 1995 states that "feelings evoked from 
the skirmish with UTA was listed as Mr. Farnworth's chief 
complaint," However, it is also noted in the medical records that 
the applicant's mother died in November 1990 and the applicant's 
daughter was diagnosed as having leukemia in 1989-90, causing him 
some psychological distress. Miller saw the applicant 4 times 
between December 12, 1990 and February 12, 1991, and did not see 
him thereafter. 
The applicant had a second right elbow surgery done by Dr. 
J. Adams in January 1991. Dr. Sellers continued to follow up on 
the left elbow problems. In March 1991, the applicant had an ER 
visit for chest pain, apparently finally assessed to be related to 
his gastro-intestinal problems and not due to myocardial 
infarction. In April 1991, the appliant began to see Dr. P. Savia 
for chronic back pain. Dr. Savia recommended physical therapy and 
followed up with the applicant, on and off all through the 
remainder of 1991. In June 1991, Dr. Adams indicated that the 
applicant had a good result from the second right arm/elbow surgery 
and could return to work, without repetitive use of the right arm. 
In July 1991, Dr. Sellers noted that the applicant was back to 
normal with respect to the right arm/elbow and was pain free. When 
the applicant was seen in September 1991 by employer-chosen 
physician Dr. G. Moress, Dr. Moress noted that the applicant felt 
his right arm/elbow was great. 
After following the applicant's chronic back pain during the 
last 8 months of 1991, Dr. Savia noted a new problem in January 
1992, i.e. chronic headaches. After January 1992, the applicant 
got follow-up of his back pain and his bronchitis/asthma through 
Granger Medical Clinic. In October 1992, the applicant began to 
get treatment for sleep apnea and related breathing problems. Dr. 
Dupont reviewed his symptoms in relating to a home oximeter study 
that he conducted. Dr. Dupont listed the applicant's 
problems/symptoms as follows: 
depression, snoring, reports of breathing cessation 
while asleep, personality changes, being 
overweight, loss of libido, non-refreshing sleep, 
difficulty concentrating, trouble at work because 
of sleepiness, often falling asleep during the day 
while trying to stay awake, unable to move while 
waking or falling asleep, chronic cough, morning 
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hoarseness, waking up coughing or wheezing, 
frequent sore throats, muscle tension in legs, 
restless legs, waking with sore muscles, abnormal 
sleep/wake schedule, and shortness of breath 
frequently smokes cigarettes . . . . frequently drinks 
caffeinated beverages in the evening . . . . history 
of unspecified nose surgery . . . . hiatal hernia and 
gastric reflux • . . . 40 lb. weight gain over past 
two years . . . . on medications that include Xanax, 
Feldene, Aspirin, Bronchial Dilator and Max Air 
Inhalar 
In December 1992, the applicant had nasal septal surgery for 
chronic sinusitis and sleep apnea. 
In August of 1992, the applicant apparently made his first 
application for Social Security Disability benefits. This was 
denied initially in October 1992. In November of 1992, the 
applicant had his left arm surgery. In April 1993, his treating 
surgeon, Dr. D. Sellers, indicates in his office note that the 
applicant's left arm had only "an occasional bit of discomfort 
after using it extensively" and "on the right side, this has 
completely resolved." Although there is an indication that a 
rating was to be performed, the ALJ has been unable to find any 
indication of a permanent impairment rating assessed in association 
with the left arm. 
The applicant requested reconsideration of his initial 
denial of Social Security Disability benefits, and in connection 
with this, in March and April 1993, he was seen by two physicians 
connected with Social Security, Dr. P. Heinbecker, apparently a 
psychiatrist, and Dr. G. McFadden, possibly an internist. Dr. 
Heinbecker noted depression, arm and back problems, hiatal hernia 
and hand tremors. He noted that the applicant had been depressed 
most of his life. Although the applicant admitted to Dr. 
Heinbecker that his left arm surgery had been successful, he stated 
that his right arm surgery and his hiatal hernia surgery were 
unsuccessful. Dr. Heinbecker noted severe back pain with exertion 
and a history of asthma for 6-7 years. He noted that the 
applicant's daughter had been diagnosed with leukemia in 1989 and 
that the family was financially strapped as a result. Per Dr. 
Heinbecker, the applicant stated that the reason he could not work 
was because of constant pain, unspecified as to location. Dr. 
Heinbecker noted the sources of pain to be his back, his headaches 
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and his arms. He diagnosed the applicant as having a personality 
disorder and major depression in remission. Dr. McFadden noted 
poorly controlled asthma, depression, migraine headaches, 
esophagitis (possibly aggravated by back pain medication), 
epicondylitis (with minimal restrictions resulting), back pain, 
sleep apnea, benign familial tremor and sinusitis. 
In May 1993, the applicant's request for reconsideration of 
his Social Security denial was denied and the original 
determination affirmed. The letter explaining the decision states: 
"Although your condition may prevent you from performing your past 
work as a bus driver, it would permit you to do other lighter 
work." After this denial, the applicant again appealed and 
requested a hearing. The November 1993 hearing resulted in the 
applicant being granted benefits, with disability beginning in May 
1989, despite the fact that the applicant did perform some work 
after that date (apparently earning an insufficient amount to be 
considered gainful). By the appendix citing in the hearing 
decision, there is a suggestion that the award may be primarily 
based on the applicant's depression. However, there are some 
handwritten transmittal forms that have been submitted that suggest 
that the applicant's epicondylitis is the primary diagnosis, 
despite Dr. McFadden's indication that this presented minimal 
restrictions. It is unclear if these handwritten forms are the 
actual final official forms designating the reason for the award. 
The ALJ would have to say that the reason for the reversal of the 
earlier denials is simply unclear from the records presented. 
At hearing, despite the indications in the medical records 
of good results from the arm surgeries, the applicant stated that 
his arm pain, bilaterally, was improved only somewhat by the 
surgeries (from a pain level of 10 out of 10 down to a 5 or 6) . In 
addition, the applicant stated that the pain level gradually 
increased after his surgeries, so that his arm pain in both arms is 
now at a 7 or 8 out of 10. With respect to his depression, the 
applicant stated merely that he has had bouts of depression in the 
past, but now feels that he cannot play with his kids, cannot leave 
the house and cannot work. He stated that he gets panicky in rush 
hour traffic. When asked about his sleep apnea, the applicant 
stated that this was caused by weight gain (a gain of 100 pounds 
per his testimony) after the May 2, 1989 accident. He stated he 
gained this weight because he could not do anything after the 
accident. With respect to his gastro-intestinal problems, he 
stated that he had had no problems since the surgery (apparently 
the fundoplication surgery in 1990 which he told Dr. Heinbecker was 
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unsuccessful) . With respect to the hand tremor that he has 
bilaterally, he states that this was worsened since the surgery 
(unclear which surgery). Prioritizing his problems, he stated that 
this arm pain and depression is his worst problem, with his back 
pain and sleep apnea being the second and third worst problems. 
The applicant stated that he has gotten no further review 
of his arm/elbow pain, since stabilizing from the surgeries in 1991 
and 1992, because there is no further treatment available. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
In the end result, the ALJ finds that the preponderance of 
the evidence indicates that the applicant's permanent total 
disability was not caused by the May 2, 1989 elbow injury or 
injuries. There is a long list of medical problems that have been 
significant problems for the applicant since the 1989 injury, all 
of which are documented clearly in the medical records. On the 
other hand, the records show only a good surgical result from the 
arm surgeries, with little or no pain or restriction in the arms by 
April 1993. The only evidentiary support for the arm symptoms 
continuing to be a problem, after that date, is the applicant's 
testimony that the pain got worse after that time. There are a 
number of reasons why the ALJ feels it inappropriate to rely solely 
on the applicant's testimony in this regard (to be explained 
below) . A similar analysis can be made with respect to the 
applicant's claim of depression related to the industrial accident. 
The applicant himself admits that he had pre-existing depression 
and alleges only that the arm pain, and possibly the dispute with 
UTA regarding a course of treatment for the arms, aggravated the 
depression. However, even if one agrees that some aggravation may 
have occurred, there is no evidence of any permanent aggravation 
and little objective evidence that there is any residual pain to 
act as a source for the aggravation. 
The ALJ finds it difficult to understand how the arm pain 
and depression can be the most significant problems that the 
applicant has (per his testimony) and result in no treatment or 
analysis. The applicant has been seen within the past few years by 
physicians for a number of other problems, including his sleep 
apnea and back pain, which the applicant lists as lesser problems. 
It does not make sense to the ALJ that the applicant would refrain 
from physician review of his worst problems and seek out review for 
/sb 
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problems of lesser significance to him. He has had no review or 
treatment for his arms since he was released to return to work 
after the arm surgeries and he has had no treatment for depression 
since 1991. The more logical interpretation of his lack of 
treatment for arm pain and depression is that these are not 
significantly effecting him. 
The ALJ notes that one has to be concerned regarding the 
reliability of the applicant's testimony when he offers 
contradictory information to his physicians. In mid-1991, the 
right arm was assessed to be normal and pain free by Dr. Sellers, 
and in 1993, at the time he was being assessed by the Social 
Security doctors, Dr. Sellers consistently found that the right arm 
symptoms had completely resolved. Despite this, at the same time 
as Dr. Sellers found the right arm symptoms resolved, the applicant 
told Dr. Heinbecker with Social Security that the right arm surgery 
was not successful. 
Another reason that the ALJ finds the applicant's testimony, 
to be unpersuasive, is that it appears that he is exaggerating the 
import of the industrial accident currently, while it was not 
emphasized as a concern when he was applying for Social Security 
Disability. He told Dr. Heinbecker in 1993 that at least the left 
arm surgery was successful, but he indicated at hearing that it was 
not, and that the surgery caused only a temporary minimal relief in 
his pain level. Although mentioned as one source of chronic pain 
to the Social Security doctors, the applicant did not relate the 
arm pain as the most bothersome problem or as a source of 
disability. Dr. McFadden found it to cause minimal restrictions. 
Similarly, Dr. Heinbecker noted that the applicant's depression was 
in remission at the time of his examination in 1993 and he also 
noted multiple non-industrial sources for the depression. Also, in 
addition to currently emphasizing problems allegedly related to the 
industrial accident, the applicant now downplays his other 
problems. He noted at hearing that his gastro-intestinal problems 
were resolved by his 1990 surgery, but told Dr. Heinbecker in 1993 
that that surgery was unsuccessful. Those non-industrial problems 
that he admits to, he states were either aggravated by the 
industrial accident or caused by it, including his depression, his 
hand tremor and even his sleep apnea, which he states was caused by 
weight gain caused by inactivity that he ultimately feels was 
caused apparently by either his arm pain or depression. There is 
no medical evidence to support the applicant's claim that these 
problems were caused or even aggravated by the 1989 industrial 
right elbow injury. 
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The ALJ should note that she is not sure at this time what 
the appropriate causal standard is for assessing causation of 
permanent total disability. Most permanent total disability cases 
involve discontinuance of work due to a number of medical problems, 
some industrial and some non-industrial. The ALJ knows that the 
appellate courts have been scornful of reading any requirement of 
11
 substantially"-caused-by into the law. However, taken to its 
illogical extreme, if one uses the opposite standard, namely any-
causal-contribution-is-sufficient, then any applicant with some 
industrially caused permanent impairment can argue that their 
eventual discontinuance of work was caused by the industrial 
accident that caused their impairment, no matter how small it is, 
because that impairment contributed to their overall disability. 
If this is the correct standard, then the result would have to be 
that the applicant in this case is entitled to permanent total 
disability benefits, because he does have a 10% upper extremity (6% 
whole person) impairment related to the 1989 right elbow injury. 
Because the ALJ is disinclined to read the law to require all 
applicants with permanent impairment to be entitled to permanent 
total disability benefits when they discontinue working, the ALJ 
will not apply the any-causal-contribution-is-sufficient standard 
in this case. However, the case law being somewhat undeveloped at 
this time, this may be determined to be incorrect. 
Because of the above analysis the ALJ finds that the 
applicant's inability to work at this time is not caused by any 
permanent aggravation to his pre-existing depression resulting from 
arm pain associated with the industrial accident, because there has 
been no evidence that any depression that the applicant has is 
permanent in nature and because there appear to be muliple possible 
non-industrial sources for any depression that he currently has or 
has had in the past. In addition, the ALJ finds that the 
applicant's inability to work at this time is not caused by arm 
pain or impairment, as the preponderance of the reliable evidence 
shows that the applicant had a good recovery from his industrial 
arm surgeries, with only minimal residual activity restriction and 
possibly discomfort. The only evidence to the contrary is based on 
the applicant's testimony alone and the ALJ has previously stated 
why she feels this testimony cannot be the sole basis of an award 
in this case. The ALJ should note that the applicant cippears to 
have had a very unfortunate course of medical and psychiatric 
problems over his life time, along with significant problems 
occurring with those close to him, so that one can only sympathize 
/ * > -
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with the tremendous resulting difficulties that the applicant has 
had to face. However, the ALJ finds that most of these 
difficulties are completely unrelated to the applicant's industrial 
accident and employment with UTA. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits is dismissed for lack of a 
causal connection between the applicant's total disability and the 
May 2, 1989 industrial accident. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within 
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the 
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion 
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days of 
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed 
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion 
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-
46b-12. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 1996. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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Defendants. * 
George E. Farnworth asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review the Administrative 
Law Judge's denial of his claim for permanent total disability compensation under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code 
R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Are Mr. Farnworth's injuries from his May 2, 1989 work accident the cause of his present 
disability? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Industrial Commission adopts the ALJ's thorough narrative of the facts of this case. In 
summary, Mr. Farnworth has a long and extensive history of medical care for a wide variety of 
psychological and medical problems. Most of his problems were not related to his work for Utah 
Transit Authority. However, he did suffer work-related epicondylitis of his elbows during 1989 and 
1990. By 1992, his problems with his elbows were substantially resolved and resulted in only a 6% 
whole person impairment, for which he has received permanent partial disability compensation. 
Mr. Farnworth continues to suffer from numerous medical problems that are not related to 
his work. He also continues to suffer from depression. In 1993, he was granted Social Security 
disability compensation. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Under Utah's Workers Compensation Act, Mr. Farnworth is entitled to permanent total 
disability compensation only if he proves that his 1989 work injury caused his now-claimed 
permanent total disability. See Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-67(1); also Large v. Industrial Commission. 
758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988). Other issues regarding Mr. Famworth's claim are not reached 
unless he first satisfies the threshold causation requirement. Zupon v. Industrial Commission. 860 
P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993). 
Having reviewed the ALJ's decision in this matter in light of Mr. Famworth's motion for 
review and the evidentiary record, the Industrial Commission agrees with and adopts the ALJ's 
careful analysis and her conclusion that Mr. Famworth's work injuries are not the medical cause of 
his alleged permanent total disability. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Mr. Famworth's 
motion for review. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this order by filing a request for 
reconsideration this Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Industrial 
Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order 
to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court. Any such petition for 
review must be received by the court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the jnatter of 
George E. Famworth Case No. 94-0842 was mailed first class postage prepaid this gkjSffilay of 
March, 1997, to the following: 
GEORGE FARNSWORTH 
5848 BRASS DRIVE 
KEARNS,UTAH84118 
DAVID K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
6925 UNION PARK CENTER #600 
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 
THEODORE KANELL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
4 TRIAD CENTER #500 
P. O BOX 2970 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2970 
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UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
3600 SOUTH 700 WEST 
PO BOX 30810 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84130 
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Support Specialist 
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